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Using microeconomic data sets from the United States and the Netherlands, this
study considers how agents perceive characteristics that are discriminated against. It
uses the examples of beauty and height to examine whether: 1) Absolute or relative
differences in a characteristic affect labor-market and other outcomes; and 2) The
effects of a characteristic change when all agents acquire more of it. Decision-makers
seem to respond more to absolute than to relative differences among individuals.
Weaker results show that an increase in the mean of a characteristic’s distribution
does not alter market responses to differences in it.
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The literature on the economics of discrimination is immense, going back at least to
Becker (1957). While research in the area has mostly been empirical—concerned with
measuring the ceteris paribus impact of an ascriptive characteristic on some economic
outcome, often earnings or wages, a small theoretical literature has made additional
fundamental contributions (see the summaries by Cain 1986; Altonji and Blank 1999).
With only one exception (Fryer and Jackson 2008), however, the theoretical literature
appears to have been unconcerned about how agents form their views of the character-
istic against which they discriminate—how they organize their impressions of the char-
acteristic that in turn affect their treatment of members of other groups. The lack of
concern with this question in the empirical literature seems to have been complete.
That the question is generally important seems clear. How do wage differences re-
spond to differences in height in the work force if new cohorts of workers are taller
than their predecessors? How would earnings differentials that arise from differences
in workers’ beauty be altered if workers generally became better-looking? How does
the impact of looks on electoral success change if the distribution of candidates’ looks
changes? Persico et al. (2004), Case and Paxson (2008), Hamermesh and Biddle (1994),
Möbius and Rosenblat (2006), Benjamin and Shapiro (2009) and Berggren et al. (2010)
have studied the market responses of these outcomes to differences in the characteris-
tics. None of these studies, nor any other, has considered the general question of how
perceptions of the characteristic affect the outcome. With Americans, and especially
northern Europeans, becoming taller, the treatment of height as an earnings-enhancing2012 Hamermesh; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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changeable by an increasingly affluent and beauty-obsessed public, how those possible
changes would affect the returns to beauty is also important.
In this study I examine these issues on a number of data sets covering several differ-
ent characteristics and outcomes, with the data coming from the United States and the
Netherlands. In several cases I run a “horse race” between models specifying the char-
acteristic as absolute and those specifying it as relative—in percentiles. Where possible
I estimate the kernel density of the characteristic and use kernel estimation to obtain a
nonparametric representation of its impact on the outcome, thus obviating spurious
results that might arise from the imposition of a particular functional form on the
relationship.
This approach seems a sensible way of introducing the empirical examination of
how perceptions of differences in ascriptive characteristics affect what we view as
discriminatory outcomes. No doubt there are other methods of doing so. Whether
there is a general answer—a consistent way in which agents form the perceptions
that affect how a characteristic alters labor- and other market outcomes—is not
clear. But by examining several characteristics in a variety of contexts I may be
able to shed a bit of light on how perceptions of differences in characteristics (in
the empirical examples here, in beauty and in height) affect outcomes that have
previously been examined without attention to the nature of the apparent
discrimination.
2. Modeling the nature of responses to personal characteristics
In this section I describe the questions of interest generally to provide a guide for fu-
ture studies, illustrating the general points with the examples I use in subsequent sec-
tions. Write a general statistical relationship between some characteristic X~f(X) and
an outcome Y as:
Y ¼ g Xð Þ; ð1Þ
where I ignore the error term and any conditioning variables in a vector Z that might
also affect Y. In many of the examples here X is a measure of beauty that affects some
outcome whose desirability increases in Y, for example, the likelihood of electoral suc-
cess, Throughout I assume that X is solely ascriptive and that the response of Y to it
reflects discrimination. I do not inquire (and, indeed, the literature only very rarely con-
siders) whether the response of Y to X reflects market discrimination or the
productivity-enhancing effects of X. I follow the literature and assume the former.
The focus throughout is on @Y/@X and how it changes in response to changes in f(X).
In particular, I first examine:
@ @Y=@Xð Þ=@σX μX;j ð2Þ
that is, how the responsiveness of Y to changes in X is altered when there is a
mean-preserving spread in X. All of the examinations of this phenomenon relate
to beauty. In them the question is how an outcome responds when there is more
dispersion in people’s looks, e.g., when the spread between the looks of people at
the 90th and 10th percentiles of looks widens. The world does not appear to have
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examining such changes directly. I thus need to formulate proxies for the shock in
(2) that can capture the change.
One way to do this is to note that one could estimate a linear (or log-linear) specifi-
cation of (1) to obtain (@Y/@X), as is standard practice. If a mean-preserving spread in
X leaves @Y/@X unchanged, a re-specification of (1) with X defined as C(X), the centiles
of X, would be an inferior description of g(X) compared to the linear (or log-linear)
specification. In other words, does the relationship g(X) describe the responses of Y to
absolute changes in X or to changes in an agent’s rank in the distribution of X? Taking
the beauty example again, I am thus asking whether beauty is better characterized by
some absolute scale or by rank in the distribution of beauty. In the empirical sections,
absent the desired exogenous shocks to f(X), I follow this approach to infer the shape
of (2).
The second issue is the estimation of:
@ @Y=@Xð Þ=@μX σX;j ð3Þ
that is, how the responsiveness of Y to X changes when there is a variance-preserving
increase in the mean of X. Using the beauty example, one of two that I use to examine
this issue, the question is equivalent to asking whether a given absolute difference in
people’s looks affects some outcome equally if the average person is bad-looking,
average-looking or good-looking. In the case of height, the issue is whether an increase
in average height in a population alters the responsiveness of some outcome (earnings
is the example here) to absolute differences in height. In this case there are three exam-
ples in which shocks unrelated to Y generated such changes. It is a simple matter either
to compare estimates of (1) obtained from times when μX differs or to examine (1) in
the presence of simultaneous exogenous shocks to μX across groups.
The difficulty with this entire approach is that g(X) may not be linear, not based
on centiles or any other simple transformation of X, but may instead be some
high-powered, non-monotonic and perhaps even discontinuous function of X. In
the example of beauty, one needs to distinguish between inherently highly non-
linear responses of outcomes to differences in beauty and apparently nonlinear
responses that arise because relative differences in looks matter more than absolute
differences. While I cannot solve this difficulty generally, in some of the examples
the distribution of X has sufficient support to allow kernel estimation of g(X) and
thus to enable me to examine these potential problems.3. The impact of changing variance of a characteristic
In this Section I examine how changes in the distribution of beauty affect the
impacts of looks on the success of fund-raisers for a charity, on retention as a par-
ticipant in a television game show and on electoral success in a professional
organization. All three independent examples suggest that absolute differences in
looks have bigger effects on outcomes than do relative differences. The superior
“performance” of absolute differences is not always large, but taken together the
results indicate that future research on the impact of discriminatory tastes should
at least proceed from the assumption that discriminating agents care more about
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discriminate.
3.1 The beauty of charitable solicitors
Landry et al. (2006) conducted a field experiment in which solicitors for a charity went
door-to-door seeking funds, with different treatments applied randomly to potential
target households. As part of the experiment the impacts of solicitors’ characteristics,
including their physical attractiveness, BMI and personality traits, were also assessed
(separately, not by those being solicited). In their published study the authors estimated
linear regressions over all the households surveyed, of which over two-thirds contribu-
ted nothing. Here I estimate probits describing whether or not a household contribu-
ted, then tobits describing that and the amount donated. In the first set of estimated
equations I use exactly the same variables as Landry et al., a vector that includes solici-
tors’ beauty as evaluated by ten raters whose assessments were normalized and then
averaged. (Thus the mean beauty was 0.06, the standard deviation 0.611.) In the second
set of estimates I replace each male solicitor’s beauty by his percentile in the distribu-
tion of male solicitors’ looks, and similarly for the female solicitors.
Table 1 presents the estimates of the two sets of equations, with Columns (1) and (3)
containing the estimates that follow Landry et al. by including absolute beauty mea-
sures, Columns (2) and (4) reporting the results with the beauty variables re-specified
as percentiles in the distribution of own-sex beauty. The probit estimates present deri-
vatives showing the impacts of one-unit increases in the independent variables. The
estimated standard errors are clustered on the solicitors’ identification numbers. As in
the original study, male beauty has negative, but quite insignificant effects, while female
beauty has significant and quite large positive impacts2. (E.g., a two-standard deviation
increase in female beauty from the mean in this sample raises the probability that a
household contributes to the charity from 0.30 to 0.46.) The explanatory power of the




Male Beauty -0.0263 -0.6005
(0.042) (0.936)
Female Beauty 0.1353 2.6563
(0.034) (0.789)
Rank:
Male Beauty/100 -0.0739 -1.6554
(0.076) (1.838)
Female Beauty/100 0.2748 5.3858
(0.070) (1.599)
Pseudo-R2 0.0765 0.0760 0.0227 0.0225
aThe data are from Landry et al. (2006). All equations include as controls a vector of attidudinal variables, indicators of
the arm of the experiment and indicators for whether the solicitor was overweight or obese. Standard errors in
parentheses below the parameter estimates are clustered on solicitor identification numbers.
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market-wide data there is some weak evidence that the absolute effects of the relevant
characteristic dominate its relative impacts.
3.2 Beauty in a Dutch game show, 2002
Belot et al. (2012) describe a television game show in which groups of five people an-
swer questions posed by the quizmaster. At the end of the first round of questions the
contestant who earned the most points selects one of the other four group members
for expulsion from the group (and from further participation in the show). Belot et al.
demonstrate that, holding “productivity” (questions answered) constant, those contest-
ants who were rated (on a 7 down to 1 scale, averaged over ten raters) as being worse-
looking were more likely to be expelled. Using these data we can analyze whether the
likelihood of expulsion in this round of five players was greater if being relatively
worse-looking had the same effect on the probability of expulsion regardless of absolute
differences in looks among the players.
The first column in Table 2 shows the average absolute rating of the beauty of con-
testants who did not “win” in the first round of the game and were thus eligible for ex-
pulsion. The average beauty ratings of these players ranged from 5.73 down to 1.70 on
the seven-point scale. Since productivity and/or the “winner’s” preferences for expelling
other players may depend on characteristics other than beauty, I control for each
player’s score in the round of questions, a quadratic in the player’s age, and an indicator
of gender. Column (2) of this table lists conditional logit estimates of the impact of a
one-unit increase in the absolute beauty rating on the probability of expulsion. Column
(3) shows the estimated impact of moving up one in the ranking of beauty among the
four “losers” in the round.
There is a substantial difference in the explanatory power of the absolute as opposed
to the relative differences in the “losing” contestants’ looks on their likelihood of expul-
sion. The pseudo-R2 is noticeably higher in the conditional logits based on the specifi-
cation of differences in beauty as absolute. Column (4) presents estimates with both
measures (and the controls) included. A likelihood-ratio test comparing this to theTable 2 Descriptive statistics and conditional logit estimates, Dutch game show, N = 276





Absolute 3.52 -0.4911 -0.8525
(0.69) (0.2551) (0.5343)
[1.70, 5.73]
Rank in round 2.50 -0.1346 0.1627
(1.42) (0.1002) (0.2082)
Pseudo R2 0.1678 0.1571 0.1710
aThe conditional logits include as controls a vector showing the rank of the person’s score in the round, a quadratic in
age and an indicator for gender. Standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates here and in Tables 3, 5
and 6.
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the estimates in Column (3) yields χ2(1)=2.66 (p=0.10). Although not highly significant
statistically, the estimates clearly show that the “losers’” absolute beauty, not their
standing in a ranking of beauty, determines how the “winner” of a round in this game
treats them.
Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the average beauty ratings of the “losing” con-
testants in the first round of the game, and Figure 2 presents the kernel estimates of its
effects on the probability of expulsion. The density is slightly right-skewed, due entirely,
as the points in Figure 2 show, to the presence of one outlier whose beauty was one
standard deviation above that of the second best-looking among the 276 “losing” con-
testants. That this outlier contestant was expelled from the show explains the strange
upturn in the expulsion-beauty kernel estimate in Figure 2. Ignoring this individual, the
kernel estimate implies an especially large penalty to being very bad-looking, so that it
is unsurprising that absolute differences in looks describe the relationship better than
relative differences.
3.3 Economists’ beauty and AEA elections, 1966–2004
Another example that allows examining the roles of absolute position and rank in the dis-
tribution of a characteristic is provided by the data collected and analyzed by Hamermesh
(2006). The looks of each candidate in the 78 elections for office (vice-presidents and
members of the Executive Committee) in the American Economic Association that were
held from 1966 to 2004 were rated by a panel of four incoming economics graduate
students, with the average for each rater normalized and then averaged across the four
raters. In each four-person election the two candidates obtaining the most votes from the
Association’s membership won the election. Since candidates’ pictures were mailed out
with the ballots, the voters at least had the opportunity to choose (discriminate?) on the






1 2 3 4 5 6
attractiveness
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3000
Kernel density estimate












2 3 4 5 6
attractiveness
90% CI Sent away lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .3, pwidth = .45
Local polynomial smooth
Figure 2 Kernel estimation of the effect of beauty on expulsion probability, Dutch game show,
2002.
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her election, or whether the absolute extent of differences among the candidates’ looks is
what mattered for voters’ electoral choices.
Column (1) in Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation and range of the average
ratings of each candidate. That the range of the average beauty ratings is large shows
that the raters were able to make fairly sharp distinctions among the candidates’ looks.
Figure 3 presents the kernel density of the distribution of the average ratings and sug-
gests that the distribution of the averages (of the four standardized ratings) has an
extended right tail.
As in the previous sub-section, Column (2) of the table shows the conditional logit
estimates of the impact of a one standard-deviation increase in absolute beauty, in thisTable 3 Descriptive statistics and conditional logit estimates, AEA elections, N=312





Absolute 0.00 0.3623 0.5300
(0.71) (0.2043) (0.4184)
[−1.80,2.71]
Rank in election 2.50 0.1385 -0.0981
(1.12) (0.1038) (0.2123)
Pseudo R2 0.1846 0.1795 0.1853
aThe conditional logits include as controls a quadratic in the candidate’s lifetime citations up through the year before the
election, and indicators for gender, whether the person had previously held a high-level government position, was in a











-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Average rating of i
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3000
Kernel density estimate
Figure 3 Kernel of beauty density, AEA elections, 1966–2004.
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of a one-unit increase in the rank of the beauty distribution in the election; and Col-
umn (4) includes both of these variables. Also contained in each equation is a set of
controls including, most importantly, the candidate’s rank in scholarly productivity
among the candidates (measured by lifetime citations in the Social Science Citation
Index up to the election year), an indicator of gender and whether the candidate had
previously held or currently holds high public office3.
The results are qualitatively remarkably similar to those in the previous sub-
section. Again the specification of beauty as absolute describes the outcome bet-
ter than does the candidate’s position in the ranking of beauty. The differences
are not, however, as large as in the previous example. A likelihood-ratio test
comparing the conditional logit in Column (4) to the estimates in Column (2)
yields χ2(1)=0.21 (p=0.64); the same test compared to the estimates in Column
(3) yields χ2(1)=1.64 (p=0.20).
That the results indicate that voters respond to absolute differences in the candi-
dates’ looks is also suggested by the kernel estimates shown in Figure 4. The re-
sponse is monotonically increasing over the entire range of the average beauty
ratings. It is especially strong, however, as a response to increases in beauty as one
approaches the upper tail of looks. This result suggests that here too, and more
generally than is possible in the conditional logits, absolute beauty rather than
relative position in the distribution of looks determined the outcome.
4. The impact of a variance-preserving increase in a characteristic’s mean
In this Section I examine three natural experiments that allow inferring the impact
of an increase in the average of some characteristic that occurs without any change
in its variance. I use these to examine whether and how the agents’ treatment








-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Average rating of i
90% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .46, pwidth = .69
Local polynomial smooth
Figure 4 Kernel estimation of the effect of beauty on win probability, AEA elections, 1966–2004.
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of several decades. The other two—differences in average beauty across small
groups of people—were generated by apparently random mixing of the individuals
to form those groups. Unlike the previous Section, where the examples gave con-
sistent answers to the question, here the results are more mixed.4.1 The increasing height of Dutch men, 1981–2010
Two striking facts stand out about international differences in the distributions of
human heights over time: 1) By the middle of the 20th century American males were
the tallest in the world; 2) In the early 21st century Dutch males are the world’s tallest;
and American men have fallen (actually, gained only very slightly in height) far behind
their counterparts in most northern European countries4. To examine how this striking
change altered the relation between earnings and height in the labor market we use
two Dutch data sets that allow us to study this question. The focus on the Netherlands
is due to the availability of data and to the unusually large and rapid shift in the distri-
bution of heights that occurred there5.
The Dutch data are from 1981–82, 1995–96, and 2006–10 from two sources: 1) The
POLS (Permanent Onderzoek Leefsituatie), a household survey from which data are
available beginning in 1981, which continued to collect earnings data through the mid-
1990s and which also included anthropometric data. Here I use the first two years of
the POLS, 1981–82, which like later years only presented data on height in five-
centimeter categories. I also merge the 1995 and 1996 POLS data to enlarge the sample
for the middle of this nearly thirty-year time period; and 2) The DNB Household Sur-
vey, a panel study begun in 1993 and continuing through today. I use data from the
1995 wave, to match the POLS data for that period, and independent observations from
the most recent waves of the DNB panel, 2006–10. The samples are restricted to men
who are at least 150 cm tall and who are between the ages of 25 and 59 inclusive6.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics, Dutch household data, men's height (in centimeters),
1981-82 – 2006-2010a
POLS 1981-82 POLS 1995-96 DNB 1995 DNB 2006-10
Mean 177.92 180.72 181.40 182.30
Std. Dev. (7.61) (7.62) (7.17) (7.17)
Range [150, 205] [155, 200] [160, 206] [159, 206]
N 2017 1926 1339 872
aIncludes only men who are at least 150cm tall and ages 25–59.
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Table 4, which presents summary statistics for men 25–59 from the POLS and the
DNB for each of the three periods, 1981–82, 1995–96 and 2006–10. Over this
period the average heights of men in this age group increased by a highly statisti-
cally significant 4.3 cm (1.7 inches), an increase in the median height to what
would have been about the 75th percentile of Dutch men’s heights in 1981–82. It
is also worth noting that the means for the two different samples in the mid-1990s
are very similar (although the DNB estimate is statistically significantly above the
POLS estimate).
The variances are nearly the same in both POLS samples; they are also identical, but
lower, in both DNB samples. It is thus fairly likely that that the variance in men’s
heights did not increase over this period. Assuming that all the information is correct
(and the fact that average heights in both 1990s samples are quite similar is encour-
aging), comparing the 1981–82 POLS to the 2006–10 DNB we can conclude that the
assumption of a constant variance is reasonable7.
To examine the earnings-height relationship I estimate log-(annual) earnings regres-
sions, controlling for vectors of indicators of educational attainment, a quadratic in
age, and marital status, with the results presented in Table 5. The estimates for both
samples from the mid-1990s are nearly identical. Also, they are remarkably similar to
those for 1981-82—there was very little change in the earnings-height relationship in
the POLS data between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s. As a comparison of the two
set of results using the DNB data shows, however, the strong relationship observed in
the mid-1990s had become smaller by 2010 (although not significantly so due to the
larger standard error on the estimate for 2006–10). The earnings-height elasticity
dropped from 0.85 to 0.30 in these data over this period. With a linear specification the
evidence suggests that the variance-preserving increase in men’s heights in the Nether-
lands sharply reduced the impact of height on earnings.Table 5 Regression estimates, Dutch household data, men’s height, 1981–82 – 2006–10,
(dependent variable is ln(annual earnings))a
POLS 1981-82 POLS 1995-96 DNB 1995 DNB 2006-10
Height: 0.00269 0.00480 0.00467 0.00179
(0.00105) (0.00141) (0.00272) (0.00339)
Adj. R2 0.3084 0.2334 0.1949 0.1078
N 2017 1926 1339 872
aThe regressions use sample weights. Covariates include a vector of four indicators of educational attainment, a
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Kernel density estimate, 1995
Figure 5 Kernel of height density, DNB 1995.
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vided in five-centimeter ranges in the POLS data, there are insufficient support points
in those data to present meaningful kernel densities and estimates. There are sufficient
support points in the DNB data, and Figure 5 shows the kernel density of the height
measure in the 1995 DNB sample. Comparing it to Figure 6, which presents the kernel
density for these data for 2006–10, the densities are shaped fairly similarly, with the
2006–10 density shifted rightward, as is also suggested by a comparison of the means
and standard deviations in Table 4. The kernel estimates of the log-earnings-height re-
lationship for the mid-1990s, shown in Figure 7, do not look at all like those shown in
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Local polynomial smooth
Figure 7 Kernel estimation of the effect of height on ln(earnings), DNB 1995.
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the range. In the mid-1990s the relationship was increasing much further up the distri-
bution of height.
Without any further considerations the results suggest that an increase in the mean
of the distribution of this characteristic reduced the cross-partial derivative in (3). It is,
however, worth noting that the earnings-height relationship weakened in the most re-
cent sample because it turned flat or even slightly negative at a height slightly above a
level that in the early 1980s would have been just above the mean. One explanation for
the change might be that in 2006–10 we are observing a market that had not yet
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height
90% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 3.21, pwidth = 4.82
Local polynomial smooth
Figure 8 Kernel estimation of the effect of height on ln(earnings), DNB 2006–10.
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(and thus shorter) than the average Dutch male ages 25–59. If they did not perceive, or
at least did not react to differences in height among potential workers who are substan-
tially taller than they, we would observe an earnings-height relationship shaped exactly
like that shown in the kernel estimation shown in Figure 8.
To examine this possibility I separated the 2006–10 DNB sample into half sub-
samples of workers age 25–42 and ages 43–59 and re-estimated the equation for which
results were shown in the last column of Table 5. Of course, the men in the sub-
sample of older workers are shorter than those in the younger sub-sample (181.05 cm
vs. 184.28 cm), and, indeed, the variance is higher in the younger sub-sample. The cru-
cial thing to note is that the parameter estimate of the impact of height on log-earnings
in the older sub-sample is 0.0049, nearly identical to the estimates shown in Table 5 for
the mid-1990s for all men ages 25–598. Among workers in the younger sub-sample the
estimated impact of height on log-earnings is −0.0039 in 2006–10. Apparently the mar-
ket only rewarded the height of older workers, those whose distribution of heights
matched more closely that of the people who were likely to have been their employers
than did the right-shifted distribution of the heights of younger workers.
4.2 Varying average beauty in the Dutch game show and the AEA elections
The winner’s decision about whom to “send away” in the Dutch game show and the
results of the four-person elections for office in the American Economic Association
analyzed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide natural experiments for inferring how a one-
unit increase in a characteristic, in this case beauty, alters an outcome when the charac-
teristic’s mean changes. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 6 indicate that there is substantialTable 6 Descriptive statistics and conditional logit estimates, Dutch game show and AEA
elections (dependent variable is “sent away” or “elected”)*
Dutch game show AEA elections
Mean Parameter Mean Parameter
Std. Dev. estimates Std. Dev. estimates
Range Range
Beauty:
Own 0.00 −2.8587 0.00 0.3044
(0.71) (2.6098) (0.71) (0.2097)
[1.50,5.73] [−1.79,2.71]




Own x Average (0.7242) (0.4960)
Pseudo R2 0.1723 0.1994
N 276 312
*The conditional logits for the Dutch game show include as controls a vector showing the rank of the person’s score in the
round, a quadratic in age and an indicator for gender. Those for the AEA elections include as controls the person’s share of total
citations to the four candidates in the round, and indicators for gender, whether the person had previously held a high-level
government position, was in a Top 5 economics department, was not an academic, was African-American or had won a Nobel
Prize.
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across elections. In the game show the range of average looks is nearly five times the
standard deviation of the averages, and the range of average looks in the AEA elections
is also roughly that relatively large.
I assume that the average looks of participants in an individual game are independent
of the outcomes. Indeed, one might imagine that, if anything, the television producers
who considered the issue would attempt to keep the averages as close as possible in
order to maintain audience interest in the game. That consideration suggests that any
inter-game differences in the mean of looks are unplanned. The average looks of candi-
dates in a particular AEA election are almost certainly exogenous: It is difficult to be-
lieve that the AEA’s Nominating Committee, which selects the candidates, chooses sets
of especially good- or bad-looking candidates to match up in a particular election in
order to affect the outcome or generate additional voter interest in the process.
I expand the equations whose estimation underlay the results shown in Tables 2 and 3
to include interactions of the average looks of the candidates in the game or election with
the individual participant’s or candidate’s looks. The focus is on the interaction term—
does the impact of a given difference in the looks of candidates change when the average
looks in the game or election change?9 The same controls as before are included, so that
only the addition of the interaction terms distinguishes the results of estimating these
equations from the results reported in the second columns of Tables 2 and 3.
As the estimates in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 6 show, the impacts of differ-
ences in beauty on the probability of being “sent away” are somewhat smaller
when the average beauty in a game increases. The interaction term is, however,
statistically insignificant (t=0.92). The impact of individual beauty on the probabil-
ity of election in the AEA is slightly larger when the average candidate is better
looking. The change is, however, also quite insignificant statistically (t=0.51) and
substantively very minor. The appropriate inference from these results is that, if all
the participants’ or candidates’ beauty increases by the same amount, the impacts
of differences in their looks remain unaltered. A change in the mean beauty among
the choices facing agents does not change the impact of differences in beauty
among those choices.5. Review and conclusion
The general purpose here has been to introduce the question of how people’s per-
ceptions of characteristics against which they discriminate affect the responses of
outcomes to differences in the characteristics. We have examined two distinct var-
iations on the usual specifications of models measuring the impacts of personal
characteristics that can be viewed as eliciting discriminatory responses by other
agents in markets: 1) Whether the responses stem from agents comparing absolute
or relative differences in others’ characteristics; and 2) Whether changes in the
average of a characteristic shared by agents who may be discriminated against
affect the responses of the discriminating agents to the remaining differences. I
illustrated these general points with examples of personal attractiveness and height.
The work is obviously not definitive, but it introduces a question that deserves
more consideration in empirical research on discrimination.
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characteristic to characterize behavior were not large, but absolute differences in
the characteristic consistently described agents’ discriminatory responses better
than did relative differences. On the second question the results are somewhat
more ambiguous. The weak conclusion, however, is that the evidence indicates
that responses to remaining differences are not changed when the average of a
characteristic increases. In terms of our examples, being equally more attractive
than one’s competitors enhances positive outcomes by the same amount whether
the competitors are bad- or good-looking. Being a few inches taller than other
workers has the same positive effect on earnings whether the others are 5’9” or
6’1”.
I have shown that, in the context of choices that discriminating agents make between
well-defined small sets of individuals among whom they make simultaneous distinc-
tions, i.e., in the studies of the impacts of beauty, the conclusions are unambiguous.
The results suggest that the nature of responses to differences in ascriptive characteris-
tics is discernible when we can examine the explicit comparisons that discriminating
agents make among those against whom they discriminate. So too, the effects are fairly
well determined when the distribution of a characteristic shifts with no change in its
variance.
Is there any way to distinguish between the alternatives in these two questions in the
more interesting context of labor markets generally rather than in the narrower contexts
of charitable solicitations, a game show, elections in a professional organization or the un-
usually large and rapid increases in height that occurred in one country? Studies based on
secondary data describing large national random samples of workers cannot make the
required distinctions, as a number of attempts not reported here demonstrate10. One pos-
sibility would be to construct audit studies in which the characteristics of various lists of
job applicants are manipulated to allow inferences about these two issues11. Another alter-
native would be to create laboratory experiments in which groups of agents with appropri-
ately manipulated different characteristics confront other “buying” agents (although the
generalizability of any results would be questionable). Yet a third possibility would be
econometric case studies of promotion choices (tournaments) in which small numbers of
candidates who differ along one of the dimensions analyzed here are included. Overall,
given the importance of such characteristics in determining labor-market outcomes, it
would be worthwhile to understand more about how the structure of perceptions of dif-
ferences and changes in these characteristics alter individuals’ labor-market success.Endnotes
1 The mean differs slightly from zero because better-looking solicitors appear to have
contacted more households, and each observation is a household.
2 There is no effect of solicitors’ beauty on the size of the contribution conditional on
it being positive. The impact of female solicitors’ beauty in these data works through its
inducements to make some contribution.
3 Estimates of these equations that did not include these controls, and other estimates
that include the share of citations instead of the rank in this measure, yield the same
conclusions about the relative importance of absolute and relative differences in beauty.
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watch/thu-June-21-2007/stature-of-liberty for a humorous popular presentation of this
phenomenon.
5 We restrict the analysis here to men to avoid concerns about the changing labor
force participation of Dutch women. Suffice it to note, however, that Dutch women’s
heights in these samples also rose significantly and sharply over these periods. We use
men 25–59 to avoid including those who may not have reached their full adult height
or who may have begun to shrink.
6 In the four years of the POLS that are used here this restriction excludes seven
men. It excludes seven men from the DNB in 1995, and one man from the DNB in
2010. I supplement the 2010 sample going backward through 2006 with men who did
not appear in the 2010 wave. No individual appears more than once in the 2006–10
sub-sample that we use here. Of the 872 men used in that sub-sample, 449 are
observed in 2010, 136 in 2009, 83 in 2008, 109 in 2007 and 95 in 2006.
7 We can reject the hypothesis that the means of the two distributions are the same
(t=23.54). Given the sample sizes, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the variance of
the distribution was unchanged over this period.
8 Re-estimating the model for the DNB 1995 sample only on workers ages 29
through 45 (presumably a random sample of those who would reach 43 through
59 in 2009, the average year in which members of the 2006–10 sample were
observed), the estimated impact of height is even larger than it was for this co-
hort in 2009.
9 Since the average probability of being sent away is always 0.25, and that of election
is always 0.5, the main effect of average looks in a game or an election cannot be
included in the specification of the conditional logits.
10 I examined the impacts of absolute and relative rankings of heights on earnings in
the Dutch data and the American Time Use Survey, with nearly identical results for
specifications of height as absolute or relative. Similarly ambiguous results were pro-
duced for the impact of beauty on earnings in recent German data, and for estimates of
the impact of immigrants’ skin color on earnings (using data on skin color previously
used by Hersch 2008).
11 See, however, Heckman (1998) for a discussion of audit studies and some of their
difficulties. Despite concerns about whether asking businesspeople to spend time evalu-
ating resumés of phony applicants is even ethical, there seems to be no shortage of
researchers willing to undertake this type of study.
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